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I. Introduction
As all international lawyers know, international law provides for the interpretation of treaties through a set of doctrines codified at Articles 31–33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT or ‘Vienna rules’).1 These rules are
founded on the regulatory ideal that any treaty or treaty provision has one correct
interpretation, to which the states parties are bound.2 As Lord Steyn explained in
ex parte Adan, a treaty provision ‘must be given an independent meaning derivable
from the sources mentioned in [VCLT] articles 31 and 32 and without taking colour from distinctive features of the legal system of any individual contracting state.
In principle there can only be one true interpretation of a treaty’.3 In other words,
any treaty must have one true meaning, and the VCLT provides the authoritative
guide to revealing it. The Vienna rules are of course not mechanical, and we can
debate exactly how they work together and what may or may not go into the analysis. But the basic notion that treaty interpretation is governed by international law
should be unobjectionable.4

1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January
1980) 1155 UNTS 331.
2 R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2008) 9; U Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of
Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Springer 2007) 3.
3 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adan [2001] AC 477, 515–17 (Lord
Steyn).
4 For present purposes I assume the VCLT to be the sole authoritative guide to the correct interpretation of a treaty, though admittedly this assumption is subject to some qualification. First, the Vienna
rules can only go so far. By design, the components of the general rule, at Art 31, do not provide a fully
mechanical system of interpretation. As noted by the ILC, there is no hierarchy between the elements
of Art 31 VCLT, but that ‘[a]ll the various elements, as they were present in any given case, would
be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give rise to the legally relevant interpretation’. ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ 1966 YB ILC, vol 2, 219–20.
Further, the different components can be emphasized more or less heavily vis-à-vis one another, As
Gardiner notes, the ‘key to understanding how to use the Vienna rules is grasping that the rules

The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts. Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte.
© Oxford University Press 2016. Published 2016 by Oxford University Press.

Introduction

199

However, Lord Steyn continues, ‘in practice it is left to national courts, faced
with a material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it …
[I]n doing so it must search, untrammeled by notions of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous international meaning of the treaty.’5 This latter insight is, perhaps, more ambivalent. In one sense it is surely right—that
in seeking to determine the meaning of a treaty provision de novo, a national
court should not have recourse to the canons of interpretation it employs in the
interpretation of domestic statutes or contracts.6 What is less clear is whether
national courts must always be the ones to interpret treaties de novo, or whether
a degree of interpretive authority might lie elsewhere within the state—ie with
the executive branch.
This chapter examines the practice of deference to the executive, by national
courts, in the context of interpreting treaties. When faced with an issue of treaty
interpretation, to what extent must a national court engage in its own independent analysis, and to what extent ought the court give weight to interpretations
advanced by the executive branch? And if deference to the executive is permissible
as a matter of international doctrine, what considerations ought to guide the manner of deference, and the determination of how much deference is appropriate?
I argue that international law does not formally preclude national judicial deference to the executive. However the deeper question of how much weight is appropriate is more complicated, and raises serious questions of judicial policy.
On the one hand, too much deference risks opening the door to executive self-
dealing, and eroding the separation of powers.7 Judicial abdication in this area
would facilitate acute self-dealing in at least three ways. Deference empowers the

are not a step-by-step formula for producing an irrebuttable interpretation in every case’. Gardiner
(n 2) 9–10. And finally, there may be reason to go outside the Vienna rules for certain limited purposes, for example in determining how to balance the components of Art 31 VCLT in the context of
particular treaty provisions. See eg J Arato, ‘Accounting for Difference in Treaty Interpretation over
Time’ in A Bianchi, DC Peat, and M Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International Law (OUP 2015)
205 (arguing that the nature of a treaty obligation as reciprocal, interdependent, or integral is relevant
in this regard). In any case, these potential qualifications would only reveal that the international rules
of treaty interpretation are more complex than the Vienna rules appear. For present purposes it is
enough to assume that the Vienna rules are what they purport to be—the best and only authoritative
guide to revealing the correct interpretation of a treaty.
5 Ex parte Adan (n 3) per Lord Steyn 515–17.
6 National judicial practice is, of course, somewhat ambivalent on this point. For a recent example
of slippage into domestic canons in the US, see BG Group PLC v Republic of Argentina (2014) 572
US (interpreting the bilateral investment treaty at issue on the basis of domestic canons for the interpretation of contracts). Lower federal courts occasionally do better. See eg Mora v New York (2d Cir
2008) 524 F.3d 183, 196, n 19 (‘Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, our Court relies on it as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties, insofar as it reflects actual state practices’); and Risinger v SOC LLC (Dist NV,
2014) 2014 WL 804802, 2 (invoking the Vienna Rules for purposes of interpretation).
7 See E Criddle, ‘Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation’ (2003) 112 Yale LJ 1927. Further,
care has to be taken not to treat the executive as a monolith. As Rebecca Ingber explains, total or very
significant deference to executive litigation positions risks entrenching interpretations advanced by
career litigators that would not necessarily reflect the considered and wholly deliberative views of those
executive agencies with real expertise on the matter in question, or who were actually involved in the
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executive against other branches of government through enhancing its discretion
to determine the scope and meaning of treaty law for internal purposes (in the
extreme, enabling it to rewrite the law). It grants the executive undue advantages
over foreign governments, by allowing it to advance interpretations that privilege the
national interest against the interests of other treaty parties. And it unduly empowers the government over individuals in particular disputes involving issues of treaty
law—insofar as the executive is a party to the litigation, or is otherwise especially
interested. In this context it is worth recalling Hamilton’s cautionary assessment
that the courts represent ‘the least dangerous branch’, and not the executive.8 On
the other hand, a zero-deference approach risks undermining executive flexibility
in the sensitive arena of foreign affairs.9 And at a minimum, Frowein notes, ‘it is
certainly possible that the advice of ministries in rather detailed and technical treaty
matters might be better than that which the courts could work out themselves’.10
Both extremes are undesirable—the difficulty lies in drawing the right balance.
Although this question of deference to the executive has important implications for all national judicial systems, it is by no means explicitly considered
everywhere—and even more rarely answered in the same way. It has been debated
most vigorously in the United States, where the usual formulation is that courts
interpret treaties for themselves, but constructions by the executive branch are
entitled to ‘great weight’—in other words significant deference with a degree of
independent judicial supervision.11 The basic idea has long been a mainstay of
Supreme Court jurisprudence.12 But the case law pulls in widely divergent directions, and has engendered a remarkable breadth of commentary and controversy.
The goal of this chapter is to foster a critical reassessment of the US-centric debate
on deference to the executive, and to illuminate the fundamental values at stake in
apportioning interpretive authority in any national legal system.
negotiation of the treaty commitment in question. R Ingber, ‘Interpretation Catalysts and Executive
Branch Legal Decisionmaking’ (2013) 38 Yale J Intl L 359, 416–19.
8 Federalist, No 78. For analogous reasons, the executive is today often portrayed as the most
dangerous branch of government. See eg MS Paulsen, ‘The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Branch
Power to Say What the Law Is’ (1994) 83 Georgetown LJ 217 (emphasizing in particular the executive’s
interpretive authority); M Flaherty, ‘The Most Dangerous Branch’ (1996) 105 Yale LJ 1725, 1727–8.
9 See E Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An
Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts’ (1993) 4 EJIL 159, 175 (noting the prisoner’s dilemma
facing national courts in this regard: in the absence of guarantees about whether the national courts
of all parties to a particular treaty will act similarly, national courts have reason to hesitate before reining in their executive’s discretion in advancing interpretations of that agreement, for fear of hobbling
their own executive’s diplomatic capacities). For Benvenisti this dilemma may be mitigated through
enhanced cooperation across national judiciaries, but it remains a real and perennial problem; see E
Benvenisti and G Downs, ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International
Law’ (2009) 20 EJIL 59, 65.
10 JA Frowein, ‘Federal Republic of Germany’ in FG Jacobs and S Roberts (eds), The Effect of
Treaties in Domestic Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1987) 63, 85.
11 See eg Kolovrat v Oregon 366 US 187, 194 (1961).
12 See eg Factor v Laubenheimer 290 US 276, 295 (1933); Kolovrat (n 11) 194; Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc v Avagliano 457 US 176, 184–5 (1982); El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tsui Yuan Tseng 525
US 155, 168 (1999); Sanchez-Llamas v Orgeon 548 US 331 (2006); Medellin v Texas 552 US 491
(2008).
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American scholarship in this area has tended to focus on the appropriate mechanics of deference to the executive as a matter of US constitutional and administrative law. The debate has centred around the search for a systematic approach that
strikes the right balance between competing national interests, ranging from raison
d’état (eg the perceived need for a unified national approach to foreign policy) to
the separation of powers (eg concerns about expertise vs independence, and, more
radically, domestic executive law-making).13 Most scholarly positions on the propriety and appropriate extent of deference to the executive can be plotted along
an axis of these competing national interests. And indeed such interests reflect
important values. But the debate has tended to ignore two other critical axes of
interests affected by the question of deference to the executive: the interests of the
international legal order, and more locally the interests of individual claimants in
particular cases.14
This chapter takes a different approach. Rather than assessing the propriety of
deference to the executive or its appropriate forms from the internal perspective
of any particular national order, I seek to draw out the three axes of interests at
stake: national, international, and individual. I hope that divorcing the problem
from the recent American debate may help illuminate its salience in all jurisdictions. But just as importantly, I hope that a reorientation of the problem away
from the usual national concerns will shed light on both the difficulty of determining the appropriate balance, and the importance of attempting to do so.
To reiterate, as a crucial caveat: I start from the presumption that a treaty has
one correct interpretation, and that the Vienna Rules provide the authoritative
guide for accessing its true meaning. I do not want to suggest that the full panoply
of national, international, and individual values considered here ought to inform
how the VCLT analysis is conducted in the de novo interpretation of a treaty—
and certainly not that they provide justifications for materially deviating from the
Vienna Rules in order to ‘rewrite’ the treaty. These interests are rather developed
here as considerations germane to the resolution of a particular separation of powers issue: who, within the state, is best placed to engage in the proper interpretation
of international treaties.
13 Some scholars have called for doctrines of deference analogous to those found in US administrative law, whereby the courts defer to agency interpretations of their organic statutes under certain
conditions. See eg C Bradley, ‘Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs’ (2000) 86 Virginia L Rev 649
(advocating the relatively lenient doctrine of Chevron deference); Criddle (n 7) (rejecting Bradley’s
view and calling for a modified version of the more searching form of review known as Skidmore deference). Others have advocated for blunter ‘total-deference’ approach whereby courts would simply
accept executive interpretations of treaties without engaging in independent review, see J Yoo, ‘Treaty
Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation’ (2002) 90 Calif L Rev 1305; see generally RM
Chesney, ‘Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations’ (2007)
92 Iowa L Rev 1723.
14 But see Criddle (n 7) (noting the importance of considering the position of individuals in
constructing a balanced approach to deference in matters of treaty interpretation); T Franck, Political
Questions, Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (Princeton UP 1992) 116
(noting favourably, mutatis mutandis, the suspicion with which the German courts have approached
the government’s determination in other foreign affairs issues where the state is an interested party in
the litigation of a particular dispute, eg in matters of asylum).
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In the following sections, I make two descriptive claims and propose two modest normative suggestions. I contend, first, that as a doctrinal matter deference to
executives by domestic judges engaged in treaty interpretation is perfectly consistent with the law of treaties. Second, though most vigorously debated in the United
States, the questions of whether and in what way deference to the executive is
appropriate in the context of treaty interpretation are relevant to all countries—
whether the national courts address these issues explicitly or only implicitly. Third,
while the question of deference in treaty interpretation tends to be assessed by
appeal to values connected to various national interests, I argue that it ought to
entail consideration of two additional axes of values: international interests and
the interests of individuals. Fourth, and finally, I suggest that there are no easy
answers as regards the right balance. Bright-line solutions like total-deference and
zero-deference prove equally problematic, but the propriety of any particular balancing scheme depends on historical, social, and political context. The most we
can ask is that domestic judges take all three axes of interest into consideration
in determining the appropriate balance of deference due to national executives in
treaty interpretation.

II. The Doctrinal Question
The first question is whether deference to the executive is permissible under the
VCLT at all, or whether domestic courts should consider themselves bound to
engage in treaty interpretation de novo. This section suggests that on this question
the international law of treaties is ambivalent, and ultimately results oriented. The
state is bound by its treaty obligations, and the Vienna rules provide the authoritative guide to the correct interpretation of these primary treaty norms. If the
state materially fails to comply with the treaty, as properly construed, it will be in
breach and its international responsibility will be engaged. So in the abstract, and
appreciating that courts have a responsibility to get the law right, we can say with
Lord Steyn that a national court should follow the proper method of interpretation
codified in the Vienna rules.15 But as a matter of international law they are under
no direct obligation to interpret a treaty de novo. Deferring to the executive’s interpretation of a treaty does not of itself breach any obligation under the law of treaties, though it surely entails a certain abdication in favour of executive discretion.
From the perspective of the law of treaties, there is an undeniable tension between
deference to the executive and the rules of interpretation codified by the VCLT.16
Obviously a conflict will arise where the court defers to an executive interpretation
15 Ex parte Adan (n 3) per Lord Steyn.
16 D Bederman, ‘Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation’ (1994) 41 UCLA L Rev 953, 973
(suggesting that the VCLT disapproves of the use of national materials for interpretive purposes
including ‘executive branch representations as to the meaning of a provision’, and noting that the
use of domestic canons of interpretation including deference to the executive can lead to interpretive
results at odds with the Vienna rules).
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that cannot be supported by the Vienna rules. As David Bederman noted already
in 1994, ‘[t]here is greater conflict today than ever before between US practice and
more international approaches to treaty interpretation’17—a point no less true two
decades later, with the added difficulty of reconciling US judicial practice even
internally.18 However it is important to understand that deference to the executive does not necessarily produce such divergences; where the executive proffers an
interpretation consistent with the Vienna rules, judicial deference would cause no
problems from the point of view of international law. The problem—if there is
one—lies in the fact that so much depends on the executive branch.
The fact of tension between deference to the executive and the Vienna rules thus
does not mean that the latter proscribes the former. To the contrary, the VCLT
does not impose any direct obligation on national courts at all. While the Vienna
rules provide the best and only authoritative guidance for any interpreter of a
treaty, there is no reason to conclude that they impose an independent obligation
on such interpreters to approach the task of interpretation in any particular way—
that is, an obligation independent of the primary obligation under interpretation.
The VCLT does not bind domestic courts to follow the rules of interpretation it
codifies comprehensively and exhaustively. And a state does not violate the VCLT
when its courts fail to apply the canons of interpretation codified at Articles 31–
32, or when they rely on other doctrines. The law of treaties is rather focused on
results.
As a matter of international law, a court may come to a ‘correct’ or ‘permissible’ interpretation of a treaty provision through means other than reliance on the
factors of Article 31 VCLT—including by simply abdicating in deference to an
interpretation espoused by the executive.19 If the domestic court thereby arrives
at a permissible interpretation, there is no harm done (in this particular instance).
If, however, the court comes to an interpretation that cannot be supported by the
Vienna rules, the risk is that the state may find itself in breach of the primary treaty
rule in question.
Strictly in terms of international legal obligation it thus seems perfectly acceptable for a domestic court to defer to the executive on matters of treaty interpretation. To the extent the court defers to its judgment, the executive becomes the
bearer of the state’s duty to comply with its primary obligation—the treaty under
17 Bederman (n 16) 972.
18 cf Hamdan v Rumsfeld 548 US 557 (2006) (affording no deference to the executive’s interpretation) with Sanchez-Llamas (n 12) (decided in the same term as Hamdan and reverting to the typical
‘great weight’ standard).
19 In discussions surrounding this volume, Georg Nolte raised the important point that the principle of the rule of law might require the court to give reasons, which might cut against the idea that
national courts could simply adopt any approach to interpretation so long as they reach the right
results. On this principle, to take the example raised by Michael Waibel in this context, simply flipping a coin would seem a deficient basis for deciding, even if it produced the right result. It may be
that this principle would strongly cut against a judicial policy of blind, total deference. However, as
detailed in the following sections, it may be that there are sufficient reasons in favour of a lesser degree
of deference to justify refraining from engaging in a de novo VCLT analysis, without running afoul of
the importance of reason-giving.
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interpretation. If the executive’s interpretation can be reconciled with the VCLT,
then no problems arise. And if the courts defer to an executive interpretation that
cannot be justified under the Vienna rules, the state may find its international
responsibility engaged.
Yet, even if deference to the executive is permissible in principle, it remains to
be seen whether courts or executives are better positioned to engage in treaty interpretation, or whether some level of cooperation may be most appealing. Further, it
remains to be considered how such cooperation might be legitimately structured,
bearing in mind the ultimate responsibility of the courts to ensure that the law is
rightly applied.

III. Deference to the Executive in
the United States and Beyond
As of the mid-twentieth century, the US Supreme Court has typically attached
‘great weight’ to the State Department’s views on treaty interpretation—adopting a
quasi-administrative doctrine of deference based on the executive’s peculiar expertise in treaty affairs, alongside concerns grounded in raison d’état. Indeed until
only recently it was possible to say that as an empirical matter, within the United
States, the executive’s position was the best predictor in matters of domestic judicial treaty interpretation.20 But at the same time, the doctrine is remarkably under-
theorized within the practice of the courts. Especially in light of recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence, it is difficult to tell a coherent story about where deference
to the executive is appropriate in interpreting an international treaty, and how it
can be justified.21 Moreover, it is far from clear what kind of review the doctrine
actually entails.22
The 1961 Supreme Court judgment in Kolovrat v Oregon may be taken as a
representative application of the ‘great weight’ doctrine.23 The case concerned
the disposition of property left by two residents of the State of Oregon who had
died intestate, with no heirs or next of kin except a handful of Yugoslav nationals residing in Yugoslavia. A particularly restrictive Oregon statute barred passage
of intestate property to aliens living abroad, and the State filed petitions to take
the relevant property for itself. In relevant part, the Yugoslav nationals claimed
that an 1881 Treaty between the United States and Serbia—to which Yugoslavia
had succeeded—should prevail over the restrictive Oregonian law by operation

20 Bederman (n 16) 1013.
21 See eg in 2006 Hamdan (n 18) (no deference) and Sanchez-Llamas (n 12) (giving ‘great weight’
to executive interpretation); and in 2014, BG Group (n 6) (stating the Court will merely ‘respect
the Government’s views about the proper interpretation of treaties’ (my emphasis)). For a longer
term historical perspective on the twists and turns of the Court’s jurisprudence, see D Sloss, ‘Judicial
Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical Perspective’ (2007) 62 NYU Ann
Surv Am L 497, 498, 505–22; Bederman (n 16).
22 Chesney (n 13).
23 Kolovrat (n 11).
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of a provision providing for most favoured nation (MFN) treatment as regards
either party’s nationals ‘acquiring, possessing or disposing of every kind of property’.24 Given that several other bilateral treaties between each party and third
states explicitly included rights of inheritance in this regard, the Yugoslav nationals
argued that the US-Serbia Treaty thus guaranteed their right to collect over and
above Oregonian law.
The Court held in favour of the Yugoslav nationals, finding that the 1881
Treaty did indeed protect their inheritance rights via MFN treatment. However
the Court did not reach its conclusion by interpreting the Treaty de novo. It stated
that ‘while courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by
the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is given great weight’.25 The Court accordingly relied on the practice
and statements of the US State Department for authoritative guidance, in combination with the Government’s brief amicus curiae—all of which supported reading
the MFN provision to encompass the Yugoslav nationals’ rights to inherit. The
Court justified its abdication of a degree of judicial independence on the basis of
the expertise and experience of the executive branch.26
The ‘great weight’ standard is not a total abdication. It lies somewhere in
between simply adopting executive interpretations (total-deference) and engaging in de novo interpretation in all instances (zero-deference)—though perhaps
significantly closer to the former than the latter. The doctrine reflects a cooperative
approach to the interpretation of international agreements, apportioning power
between the judiciary and the executive. What is more difficult to pin down is how
the courts really balance the branches’ respective interpretive authority, on a long
view of the jurisprudence.
While the ‘great weight’ doctrine has long been a jurisprudential commonplace,27 the standards have shifted dramatically over time—even within Supreme
Court case law. As David Sloss has demonstrated, throughout the early years of
the Republic the courts afforded the executive no deference at all—engaging in
a completely independent de novo interpretation of treaties until at least the mid-
nineteenth century.28 And even as of the 1930s the Court was applying a significantly more tentative formulation than the ‘great weight’ standard. For example,
in Factor v Laubenheimer (1933) the Court held merely that for purposes of ‘resolving doubts the construction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless
of weight’.29 And though the ‘great weight’ standard seemed to stabilize in the
24 Kolovrat (n 11) at n 6.
25 Kolovrat (n 11) 194.
26 The Court relied, for its standard of deference, on a 1933 case that actually adopted a much
weaker formulation that reserved deference only for ambiguous cases: Kolovrat (n 11) at n 11, citing
Factor v Laubenheimer (n 12) 295 (‘And in resolving doubts the construction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is
nevertheless of weight’).
27 See eg Kolovrat (n 11) 194; Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc v Avagliano, 457 US 176, 184–5
(1982); see also El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 US 155, 168 (1999). Bederman (n 16).
28 Sloss (n 21) 498, 505–22.
29 Factor v Laubenheimer (n 12) 295 (my emphasis).
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late twentieth century, the doctrine has again unravelled in recent major cases. In
Hamdan v Rumsfeld (2006) the Court afforded no deference to executive views
at all—without even mentioning the doctrine.30 And yet, in a consular rights
case decided later in the same term, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon (2006), the Court
declared the Kolovrat ‘great weight’ standard alive and well (and applicable).31 Thus
it appears that the Court has generally applied some standard of deference since
at least the turn of the twentieth century, but the precise contours and limits of its
doctrine remain unclear (and may remain in a state of flux).32
The American case thus shows that the question of deference to the executive
is not a binary. There is rather a spectrum of options, and the courts have shifted
from pole to pole over the years. A wide range of possibilities are available, which
may be more or less justifiable. But at the same time, given that the choice of how
to draw the balance can be decisive in particular cases, the Supreme Court’s frenetic
approach in recent years is troubling. The American experience thus further demonstrates the importance of addressing this doctrinal challenge clearly and openly.
Still, to the American public lawyer, at least in principle, the idea of deference to
the executive seems a natural extension of typical deference-oriented principles of
our administrative law. The doctrine may be more surprising—even shocking—to
foreign audiences, if not always for the same reasons.
In some countries, where treaty interpretation is the exclusive constitutional
prerogative of the courts, the possibility of deference to the executive may appear
as no less than an abdication of judicial independence. This seems to be the case
in Austria33 and Canada,34 for example, where the courts entertain no doctrine of
deference to the executive, and more or less in Germany as well—though it is not
unheard of for the German courts to give executive interpretations some weight
in certain cases.35
30 Hamdan (n 18).
31 Sanchez-Llamas (n 12).
32 See HP Aust, A Rodiles, and P Staubach, ‘Unity or Uniformity? Domestic Courts and Treaty
Interpretation’ (2014) 27 LJIL 75, 92.
Petz, ‘Austria’ in D Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal
33 See E Handl-
Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (OUP 2011) 84–5 (noting that ‘Austrian courts
do not defer to the views of the executive branch’ but rather interpret treaties de novo, by reference
to the VCLT. Handl-Petz contends that the courts follow this approach ‘because of the theory of
separation of powers, which provides that the courts are independent from the executive branch and
therefore are free to interpret treaties without guidance from the executive branch’).
34 See G van Ert, ‘Canada’ in D Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement (CUP
2009) 186–7 (noting that there is ‘no doctrine in Canadian law requiring courts to defer to the executive in questions of treaty interpretation. To the contrary, the interpretation of treaties is regarded as
a legal question within the scope of the judicial function’); and S Beaulac and JH Currie, ‘Canada’
in D Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and
Persuasion (OUP 2011) 132 (‘In Canada there is no established practice for government authorities to
provide an official interpretation for treaties’).
35 See HP Folz, ‘Germany’ in D Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal
Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (OUP 2011) 244 (‘In German constitutional
law there is no tradition of judicial deference to the executive in foreign policy matters’. Going further,
Folz adds that ‘[a]ny intervention by the executive in favour of a quasi-authoritative interpretation
of a treaty provision might be construed as incompatible with the principle of separation of powers’). But see Frowein (n 10) 85 (noting that while ‘German courts cannot ask for a binding advisory
opinion from competent ministries … [t]his does not mean … that the courts do not give weight to
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In other countries, at least at some times, the question of treaty interpretation
is not a matter for the judiciary at all. In France, for example, from the mid-
nineteenth century until as recently as 1990, the courts generally considered treaty
interpretation to be the exclusive domain of the executive. Rather than engage in
independent interpretation, the courts would ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
for its advice on matters of interpretation, and consider themselves bound by the
referral.36
And in some countries the practice has shifted, in recent years more commonly
from a regime of deference to a regime of independent interpretation.37 In France
the Conseil d’État changed course dramatically in 1990, deciding in the GISTI
judgment that from then on it would be competent to interpret treaties for itself.38
While it still makes use of the referral procedure, the Conseil no longer treats the
Ministry’s responses as formally binding.39 The shift took place while France was
subject to a suit before the ECtHR challenging the independence and impartiality of the Conseil d’État (Beaumartin v France), which some have credited for the
Conseil’s shift in judicial policy.40 A similar shift occurred in Mexico between the
1990s and 2000s, in parallel to the transition to democracy and increased regional
economic integration.41
Evidently practices vary widely across states, and over time. Every country
makes a choice about how to apportion interpretive authority over international treaties—whether explicitly or de facto. The concept of deference to the
executive represents a diverse family of judicial mechanisms for striking a balance between the branches. Its elaboration helps illuminate the myriad solutions available to states beyond the extreme options of hermetic de novo judicial
interpretation and exclusive executive competence. Given that international
law does not seem to proscribe or endorse any particular domestic approach,
the really fundamental question is how to weigh the innumerable institutional
arrangements available.

information supplied by the ministries concerning the parties’ intention as to a specific treaty provision’. Indeed, Frowein suggests that the Federal Constitutional Court has at least frequently ‘referred
to the position of the Federal Government concerning an interpretation of highly political treaties’—
eg the Treaty on Basic Relations with the GDR); see also Franck (n 14) 119.
36 See E Decaux, ‘France’ in D Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic Legal
Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (OUP 2011) 228; Benvenisti (n 9). The situation may not have been, even then, an absolute case of total deference—it seems that the courts
were willing to interpret treaties autonomously when they determined the text to be sufficiently clear
(Acte Claire). See JD de la Rochère, ‘France’ in FG Jacobs and S Roberts (eds), The Effect of Treaties in
Domestic Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1987) 49.
37 See Benvenisti and Downs (n 9) (noting and exploring a general tendency of national courts to
shift away from policies of deference to the executive over the last twenty years).
38 GISTI Judgment (29 June 1990), RGDIP 94 (1990) 879; see Decaux (n 36) 228; and E Bjorge,
‘“Contractual” and “Statutory” Treaty Interpretation in Domestic Courts? Convergence around the
Vienna Rules’ in this volume, at 49.
39 Decaux (n 36) 228.
40 Decaux (n 36) 228.
41 See Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 32) 92.
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IV. Normative Considerations
Granting that national courts are under no obligation to forgo deferring to executives in matters of treaty interpretation as a matter of international legal doctrine,
there may still be strong normative reasons to resist affording such deference—or to
temper the level of deference involved.42 Just because a judicial practice is permissible does not mean that it is desirable—or even sensible. As noted above, there
are three different axes of interests at stake: (1) national interests; (2) interests of
the international legal order; and (3) interests of individual litigants in particular
cases. Each axis contains varied and competing values that speak to the appropriate
level of deference due to national executives. Within each axis we might think of a
sliding scale from zero-deference to total-deference, with various degrees and forms
of deference populating the middle. These various middle ways represent attempts
to balance the competing interests at stake. This section will canvass the relevant
values and considerations across each axis in turn. I suggest that each gives reason
to be suspicious of too much deference—though none clearly speak in favour of de
novo review across the board.

1. National interests
At least within the United States debates about the propriety of deference to the
executive and its appropriate extent have tended to focus almost exclusively on the
national interest.43 The battle lines tend to be drawn around the value of raison
d’état and executive expertise in foreign affairs on the one hand, and concerns
about the separation of powers, judicial independence, accountability, and democracy on the other. Few take really extreme positions, with most scholarly proposals
attempting to reach some kind of balance among these concerns.
At one end of the spectrum is the view that the executive is entitled to total
deference. Within the United States this view is associated with John Yoo, who
grounds his case on the President’s constitutional competence in foreign affairs.44
Despite its purported constitutional pedigree, this view is most concerned with
raison d’état, emphasizing the need for executive flexibility and the special expertise
of the executive on matters of foreign affairs.45 Few take the total-deference view
seriously, and it seems to have never gained credence in US courts (although the
US has itself argued for this position before the Supreme Court, most notably—
and abortively—in Hamdan).46 However the Supreme Court has come close to
42 I use the term normative here not in the sense of ‘pertaining to law’ (ie to norms), but rather
to connote something about how the world ought to be. A normative argument about the law does
not describe the law as it is, but criticizes or proposes new configurations on the basis of particular set
of values, legal or otherwise. This section thus proposes considerations for assessing whether certain
national institutional arrangements, though compliant with international law, are also desirable.
43 But see Criddle (n 7).
44 Yoo (n 13).
45 Yoo (n 13).
46 Hamdan (n 18). See Sloss (n 21) 498. Other countries have more fully embraced a total deference regime at various times, whether explicitly or de facto. In France, for example, prior to [recent
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this position with its ‘great weight’ standard, whereby executive interpretations
are entitled to significant deference, subject only to a vague modicum of judicial supervision.47 The precise balance has fluctuated with the composition of the
Court. But as Bederman suggests, under the ‘great weight’ standard the executive’s
interpretation has proven far and away the best predictor of the Court’s ultimate
holding.48
At the other end of the spectrum is the idea that courts should not defer to
the executive in matters of treaty interpretation at all, but rather engage in de
novo review. Few scholars have advocated this position in the United States,49
but it seems as though the Supreme Court followed a zero-deference approach
in the early years of the Republic, until the mid-nineteenth century.50 More
recently the Court has sporadically returned to this position, refusing to adopt
a deferential approach in certain major cases without explanation (eg Hamdan
and BG Group). Here the view tends to be grounded on a rigid conception of
the separation of powers coupled with fears of executive self-dealing, or, more
generally, executive law-making through the free interpretation and implementation of international engagements. Still, Hamdan aside, the ‘no deference’
extreme has few advocates within the United States. It does, however, seem
more natural in other jurisdictions like Austria,51 Canada,52 and Germany53
where judicial abdication in matters of treaty interpretation is hardly contemplated (if at all).
Most views lie somewhere in the middle, taking seriously the separation of
powers concerns attending total judicial abdication while trying to find a balance with a perceived need to not undercut the executive on the international
plane.54 Authors in this vein attempt to balance the competing interests in
different ways, usually drawing from standards of deference already familiar in

legislative reforms] the courts were not permitted to interpret treaties for themselves at all. See Bjorge
(n 38) 55.
47 Kolovrat (n 11) 194; see also Sumitomo Shoji America v Avagliano et al (n 27) (‘although not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with
their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight’).
48 Bederman (n 16). As noted above, however, the predictive value of executive interpretations in
the courts has ebbed somewhat in the Roberts era. See Hamdan (n 18); Sloss (n 21) 498.
49 But see A Glasshauser, ‘Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation’ (2005) 50 Villanova
L Rev 25.
50 Sloss (n 21) 498.    51 Handl-Petz (n 33) 84–5.    52 Van Ert (n 34) 186–7.
53 Folz (n 35) 244.
54 For a recent example of the debate playing out in the centre, see Benvenisti and Downs (n 9) 65
(strongly questioning outsized policies of judicial deference in matters of treaty interpretation, but
still noting the legitimate and perennial problem of how to rein in executive interpretive discretion
‘without damaging their executive branches’ effectiveness in the area of foreign policy and risking serious political problems for themselves domestically’); and J Katz-Cogan, ‘National Courts, Domestic
Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law: A Reply to E Benvenisti and G Downs’ (2009)
20 EJIL 1013, 1017–19 (strongly challenging Benvenisti and Downs’s position that national courts
ought to find ways to untether themselves from deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs
on grounds of legal and relative institutional competence, but stopping well short of dismissing a role
for courts entirely).
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the context of US administrative law.55 But in the main the level of deference
these scholars consider appropriate tends to be linked to the degree of weight
they give to the competing national values; raison d’état, expertise, and the
need for executive flexibility in foreign affairs on the one hand, versus separation of powers, judicial independence, and avoiding executive self-dealing on
the other.
Executive autonomy, expertise, and flexibility in foreign affairs, judicial independence, and the limitation of executive power all reflect important domestic
values. Along this axis, the extreme positions of total-and zero-deference seem
undesirable, and it is difficult to say in the abstract how strongly either pole should
pull in drawing the balance. But these concerns populate only one particular axis
of interests affected by domestic approaches to the interpretation of international
treaties. Without intending to diminish the importance of debating and balancing
these values, I want to suggest that the scholarly tendency to focus on domestic
separation of powers concerns leaves out important interests implicated by the
question of how to apportion domestic authority to interpret international treaties: the interests of the international legal order itself and the interests of individual claimants in particular cases.

2. International interests
Though less well examined than its effects on the domestic separation of powers,
the level of judicial deference afforded to national executives has important implications for the international legal order as well. Although international law may be
neutral on the question of deference to the executive as a matter of doctrine, the
question has important normative implications for the international legal order as
a system.
The basic point is that, as interpreters of international treaties, domestic courts
owe something to the treaties they interpret. By extension, they owe something to
the other states parties, as well as the international legal order taken as a whole.
This conclusion rests on two premises.
First, any national court has an obligation to get the law right, which means
making sure that it is applying an international legal rule correctly, in accordance
with the international rules of interpretation.56 It may be that this interpretive
authority can be shared with the executive, to a degree. But the court’s duty to
get the law right requires some meaningful degree of judicial supervision. Courts
cannot fulfil their responsibility to ensure that they are applying treaty law—as
properly construed—if they completely (or even largely) abdicate in favour of the
executive’s interpretation.

55 See Bradley (n 13) (advocating lenient Chevron deference); and Criddle (n 7) (advocating
the more searching Skidmore deference). See also J Weiss, ‘Defining Executive Deference in Treaty
Interpretation Cases’ (2011) 79 Geo Wash L Rev 1592.
56 Ex parte Adan (n 3) per Lord Steyn; Mora v NY (n 6).
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Second, national courts have a particular responsibility to supervise the proper
interpretation of treaties because their judgments have a recursive relationship to
the treaty being applied. Treaty interpretation by domestic courts can have significant jurisprudential effects on the development of the treaty in question as a
matter of international law. Most directly, domestic judicial opinions can contribute to the formation of subsequent state practice relevant to interpretation under
Article 31(3)(b) VCLT.57 And more generally, under the classic doctrine of sources
national judgments are sometimes treated as subsidiary sources for determining
the meaning of rules of international law.58 As a result, domestic interpretations
can have a significant impact on the meaning of a treaty over time.59 They not only
interpret and apply international treaties, but further contribute to their meaning
and affect their growth.60 Given their broader influence, domestic courts ought to
57 ILC, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty
Interpretation’ (Georg Nolte, Special Rapporteur) (19 March 2013) UN Doc A/CN.4/660 [120–1],
[144]; Gardiner (n 2) 228–9. More is of course required, in particular sufficient practice by the
other treaty party or parties that the judicial interpretation in question reflects the parties’ agreement on a point of interpretation: Gardiner (n 2) 235; J Arato, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive
Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences’
(2010) 9 LPICT 443, 460. It should be further noted that for purposes of determining subsequent
practice, a national court judgment may not represent the last word of the state in any particular case.
58 ‘Judicial opinions’ are expressly mentioned in the classical formulation of the sources of
international law in the Statute of the International Court of Justice as ‘subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law’. ICJ Statute 38(1)(d). This subsidiary source is understood by some
commentators to include judgments of domestic courts for purposes of determining the meaning
of international legal instruments, including treaties. See eg H Thirlway ‘The Law and Procedure
of the International Court of Justice 1960–1989: Part Two’ (1990) 61 BYBIL 1, 114; see contra
A Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in A Zimmerman, C Tomuschat, and Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds), The Statute
of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (OUP 2006) 788 (suggesting that national
judicial decisions are not envisioned by Article 38(1)(d), and that ‘these decisions should better be
treated as elements of State practice in the customary process or, maybe, as being at the crossroads
between evidence of practice and opinion juris’).
59 In some particularly extreme cases, international courts have relied on national judicial practices among the states parties to establish a thoroughgoing modification of the treaty at issue. See eg
Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom ECHR 2010-II 61 (wherein various national legislative and judicial
practices prohibiting the death penalty were taken as grounds for determining that clauses in the
ECHR permitting recourse to capital punishment had been modified out of the convention). See
J Arato, ‘Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in International
Organizations’ (2013) 38 Yale J Intl L 289; G Nolte, ‘Report 2. Jurisprudence Under Special Regimes
Relating to Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice’ in G Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent
Practice (OUP 2013) 210, 244.
60 Indeed even within the US, Justice Powell offered a rare reflection on the point in 1972—noting
that ‘[u]ntil international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of the various countries
afford the best means for the development of a respected body of international law’. First National
City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba 406 US 759, 775 (1972). And there is reason to believe that as
a matter of politics the potential of national courts in this regard is more potent than ever. Writing
in 1993, Benvenisti lamented that Powell’s words seemed ‘somewhat idyllic’ in view of the extent to
which national courts defer to their respective executives. Benvenisti (n 9) 159. But revisiting the
point only sixteen years later, and noting in particular a tendency of national courts to rein in executive discretion in matters of foreign affairs, including interpretive authority, the same author finds
dramatically increased prospects for national courts to play a robust and desirable jurisgenerative
role. Benvenisti and Downs (n 9) 60 (‘In retrospect, it is now increasingly clear that the continued
persistence with which national courts employed such heuristics was a mistake which has serious consequences’, among them ‘limit[ing] their influence over the design and subsequent operation of the
rapidly expanding international regulatory apparatus’).
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at least consider the needs of the international order with which they are engaging
when determining whether and how to defer to national executives in matters of
interpretation.
From this perspective it seems important that domestic courts are engaging with
and enforcing international law, and as a result have a responsibility to ensure that
the state applies such international legal commitments in good faith—in parallel
to (or even despite) the courts’ responsibility to their own national interests. From
another point of view, the basic idea of the national court’s dual responsibility
to the international legal order alongside its duty to its own municipal system is
classically captured by Georges Scelle’s concept of dédoublement fonctionnel (functional doubling), whereby the domestic court is reconceived as an agent of both its
own national legal order as well as the international legal order, depending on the
norms it is charged with applying in a particular case.61
Here again the extent to which domestic judicial deference to the executive
seems appropriate will depend upon which values we emphasize: with fidelity,
consistency, and coherence in the interpretation and application of international
treaty norms on the one hand,62 and flexibility, dynamism, and even experimentalism on the other.63 The issue comes down to the branches’ different institutional capacities, and to an extent their divergent logics of action. On the one
hand, as noted by Benvenisti and Downs, the tendency to defer to executive
policy in the interpretation of international legal rules has ‘limited the influence
of national courts on the design and subsequent operation of the rapidly expanding international regulatory apparatus when more active engagement on their
part might have led to a more coherent and less fragmented international legal
system’.64 But on the other hand there may be situations in which the executive is better positioned to advance innovative interpretations (unilaterally or by
negotiation with its foreign counterparts), and where some executive flexibility
to experiment would be desirable. Indeed, both the extremes of total-or zero-
deference seem suspect, and better answers will have to be sought within a spectrum of legitimate possibilities in between.
As with the national perspective, total judicial deference to the executive seems
untenable from the perspective of international law. Recognizing that as regards
treaty interpretation the issue of judicial deference generally comes up in the context of disputes where the executive is a party (or at least an amicus), the potential
for executive self-dealing against the interests of the other treaty parties is simply
too great to support a maximally deferential approach.65 We are here not only
61 G Scelle, Précis de droit des gens: principes et systématique (Sirey 1932) vol 1, 43, 54–6, 217;
G Scelle, Précis de droit des gens: principes et systématique (Sirey 1934) vol 2, 10, 319, 450; A
Cassese, ‘Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role-Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International
Law’ (1990) 1 EJIL 210; and more recently O Frishman and E Benvenisti, ‘National Courts and
Interpretive Approaches to International Law: The Case Against Convergence’ in this volume, at
317, 328 (on the concept of sovereigns as trustees of humanity).
62 A Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011).
63 Frishman and Benvenisti (n 61).
64 Benvenisti and Downs (n 9) 60.
65 Criddle (n 7).
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worried about executive self-dealing proper (ie interpretations shoring up the
executive’s own power as an organ), but also the temptation to use interpretation as a tool to further the interest of the state as against that of the other treaty
parties. And even putting self-dealing to the side, such strong judicial deference
will be troubling in and of itself to those who emphasize unified and consistent
approaches to interpretation across national and international courts as a feature of
the international rule of law—particularly insofar as it enhances executive discretion and may obviate the executive’s need to explain interpretive choices.
But a zero-deference approach is not necessarily desirable either. First it must
be recognized that judicial refusal to defer to the executive does not necessarily
imply that the domestic court will actually do a better job interpreting a treaty
from the perspective of the VCLT, either due to pre-commitments to domestic
canons of interpretation,66 due to less familiarity with the subtleties of interpreting international treaties under the Vienna rules, or indeed less familiarity with the
complexities of a highly technical treaty regime.67 Second, and likely more controversially, a degree of interpretive discretion for national executives may be a good
thing for the international legal order.68 Executives may be in a better position
than domestic courts to advance new or dynamic interpretations of international
treaty obligations and to negotiate their interpretive positions with their foreign
counterparts—as in the case of the trilateral interpretive negotiations to define
the meaning of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in the context of the NAFTA.69
Stated differently, executives may have a degree of flexibility and responsiveness
necessary for experimentation in the long-term application and development of
treaty regimes that domestic courts may lack.70 While total judicial deference may
incentivize self-dealing or nationalistic manoeuvring, total judicial supervision
may prove a bar to progress and risk stagnation.
So here again it seems like some degree of balance is appropriate—but it is much
less evident, along this axis, that far-reaching deference to the executive would be
particularly beneficial. There is some reason to think that a degree of executive
discretion to advance and negotiate adventurous interpretations may be valuable
from the international perspective, but the broader takeaway from this standpoint
is that national courts should be cautious: too much deference can undermine the
international treaty, the intentions of the parties, and more generally the international rule of law. Still, although the balance seems to tip more clearly toward independent review from this point of view, as compared to the national perspective,
the question of how exactly to strike the right balance ultimately proves mercurial
here as well.

66 See BG Group (n 6) (Relying on domestic canons for the interpretation of contracts in interpreting the provisions of a BIT); Bederman (n 16).
67 Frowein (n 10) 85.
68 See Frishman and Benvenisti (n 61) 327.
69 Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter Eleven Provisions (Free Trade Commission,
31 July 2001).
70 But see Benvenisti and Downs (n 9) 65 (finding analogous potential in dialogue between
national courts, without as much of the downsides of executive discretion).
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3.  Interests of individual litigants
The final axis involves the interests of individual litigants in particular cases. Often
questions of treaty interpretation arise in the context of litigation by individuals
(or private legal persons) against the state or state officials, or in cases where the
state is a highly interested party. In such instances the court has a responsibility to
the individual beyond its responsibility to the national interest and the interests
of the international legal order. At a minimum, domestic courts must maintain a
modicum of equality of arms among the parties to a dispute, which will strongly
cut against deference to the executive where either the state or executive itself is on
one side of the litigation.71 Here again the concern is self-dealing by the state, but
as a short-term matter relating to the particular dispute.
From the perspective of individual litigants it seems clear that heavy deference is inappropriate. However it is not clear that this perspective calls for zero-
deference either—at least not in all cases. Much will turn on the particular kind
of treaty under interpretation, and the involvement of the state or state officials in the particular case. Where a dispute involves an individual claim based
on clearly reciprocal treaty obligations, like certain privileges and immunities
provisions, or certain provisions in diplomatic treaties, greater deference may
be appropriate so as not to impair the executive’s capacity to negotiate with or
secure compliance from the state’s treaty partners. But where a dispute involves
integral obligations, like fundamental human rights, deference become increasingly problematic.72
This is not to say that the distinction between reciprocal and integral obligations
can always be neatly drawn in the context of rights conferring treaty provisions.
Certain consular rights provisions, for example, may fall somewhere in between.73
But it is crucial to bear in mind that in disputes involving the rights of individual
litigants, both the risk and potential harm of executive self-dealing are particularly
high. In cases of ambiguity about the kinds of obligations at issue, at least from
this perspective of individual litigants, the human interests at stake would seem to
weigh in favour of erring toward more independent review in cases of ambiguity.

V. Conclusion
I do not pretend to have canvassed all of the relevant values along each of these
axes. I hope to have shown, however, that the relevant interests and values that
ought to be considered are not merely national, but also international and individual. And along each axis they pull in both directions—sometimes toward deference and other times toward independent review.
71 See Franck (n 14) 116.
72 See Arato (n 4); M Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of International Human Rights Treaties’ in D
Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 739.
73 Sanchez-Llamas (n 12); Medellin v Texas 552 US 491 (2008).
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From the national perspective, there are a host of values in play, some pulling
towards deference to the executive (flexibility in foreign affairs, executive expertise,
and raison d’état more generally) and others just as strongly pulling towards de novo
review (judicial independence, limits to executive power). These are all important
values. Taken together, they caution against a zero-sum approach to apportioning
interpretive authority among the branches of government.
Similarly, from the international perspective the varied values at stake pull in
both directions, with some favouring deference (interpretive flexibility on the
international level, dynamism, and experimentalism) and others favouring independent review grounded in the Vienna Rules (fidelity, consistency, and coherence
in the interpretation and application of international treaties across parties and
concerns about national self-dealing).
Even in view of the interests of individual litigants there are sometimes reasons
to afford more deference to executive interpretation depending on the kind of
treaty in question (as in the case of reciprocal norms where the executive may be
best placed to assess the compliance of foreign treaty parties). However, in general, individual interests tend to press in favour of increased judicial independence
(eg equality of arms in litigation and protection from self-dealing by an executive
or state party to the litigation at hand).
The first conclusion we can draw from this canvas is that across all three of
the above axes the extremes of total-deference and zero-deference seem normatively suspect. And it is important to recall that these extremes are not hypothetical straw men. As recounted above, both poles have been embodied: prior
to the 1990s, in France and Mexico, judges effectively afforded total deference
to executive interpretations, and arguably the US courts came close to this position during the Rehnquist era (despite adopting more balanced rhetoric); in
Austria, Canada, and Germany, as in the Early American Republic, no degree of
formal deference to the executive is contemplated and judges engage in (more
or less) completely independent review. Though the latter is surely preferable to
the former, either extreme solution would seem to abandon important values. As
Louis Henkin observed, ‘[t]here is reason for due deference to the executive, but
not for undue deference—for due judicial humility, but not undue humility’.74
There seems to be a real value in some degree of deference, certainly in terms of
legitimate national interests, but even in light of certain international interests
and along the axis of individual interests, at least with respect to certain kinds
of treaty norms.
Further, we can conclude that national practices in this area are not especially
static. Many of these countries have shifted their practices dramatically over the
years—and not only the common law jurisdictions. Judicial practice has shifted
course several times within the United States alone, but it has also changed dramatically in civil law countries like France in 1990, and Mexico between the 1990s

74 L Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs (Columbia UP 1990) 72; see also
Franck (n 14) 128.
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and the 2000s. If the reality of extreme positions makes thinking about reform
desirable, the reality of change makes its prospect plausible.75
We can go so far as to suggest that national courts and legislatures should avoid
hewing to the extremes of zero-or total-deference at risk of undermining important national, international, and individual values. Peering further, in light of all
three axes of interest, taken together, there does seem good reason to remain suspicious of deference schemes that afford a great deal of weight to executive positions
on interpretation—particularly in light of the international and individual axes.
But in terms of specifics, beyond rejecting the poles we can do little more than
endorse a balanced, responsible approach. Even in the abstract it is difficult to find
the right balance across any one of these axes, and all the more so when trying to
balance all three.76 The problem is that the various interests at stake are not fully
reconcilable—there is a lot of leeway left to national institutions, and a lot will
depend on any particular actor’s vision of national courts and executives within
the international system. No matter where we stand, the picture never comes into
perfect view.
But even more importantly there is good political reason to balk at making more
fine-grained abstract conclusions about the ‘correct’ way to balance executive and
judicial interpretive authority across space and time. The question of weighing and
balancing the relevant values is extremely contextual, depending on widely different political and cultural values. In Mexico, for example, the shift from deference
to de novo judicial treaty interpretation from the 1990s to the 2000s reflects a major
political transition, from authoritarian presidentialism to a more robust democracy
where judicial independence has become an increasingly central value. The decline
of Mexican judicial deference in treaty interpretation cannot and should not be
divorced from broader political dynamics.77 More generally, the question of balancing interpretive authority implicates fundamental socio-political and historical
narratives as much as abstract questions of institutional design—and the right
answers for the right time and place depend on close case-by-case analysis.
What we can say, beyond rejecting the extreme poles, is that a proper balance will
entail some consideration of all three axes of interest. By way of closing hypothesis,
75 Benvenisti and Downs (n 9) 60.
76 It is not easy to see how to achieve a perfect balance. Differently held values will lead to different
conclusions. One way to balance international and national interests would be for courts to engage
in a prima facie VCLT review, and deferring to any executive interpretations permissible under the
international rules on interpretation. This approach recognizes that the Vienna rules may support a
wide range of permissible alternatives and tries to grant executives limited flexibility within the broad
framework of the VCLT. Such a scheme may seem the perfect balance to those invested in unity
among judicial approaches to interpretation, but it would likely prove much less palatable to those
truly invested in executive flexibility or even dynamism in the law of treaties. For additional attempts
at balance, see Criddle (n 7) (attempting to pull things together through a take on a canon of US
administrative deference (Skidmore deference) modified to take into consideration the views of treaty
parties and the interests of individual litigants); Frishman and Benvenisti (n 61) 327 (arguing mutatis
mutandis against rigidly unified approaches to interpretation in domestic courts vis-à-vis the Vienna
Rules in the interest of flexibility, dynamism, and experimentalism, advocating instead an approach
under the rubric of sovereign’s as trustees of humanity).
77 See Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 32) 92.
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the distinction between an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of ultimate ends is
helpful in qualifying the appropriate judicial attitude toward weighing the interests at stake.78 Some form of accommodation of all of these categories of interest
is necessary in apportioning interpretive authority between domestic courts and
executives, and the concept of deference to the executive is an important tool for
constructing a balanced regime (though it is surely not the only available tool).79
Since no perfect balance can be achieved in the abstract, the specifics will often be
up to judges embedded in their own national milieux. All that we can insist on,
and indeed all that we should insist on, is that national judicial interpreters consider all three axes of interests; the appropriate balancing mechanism will have to
depend on which interests are emphasized.

78 M Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’ in HH Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology (Routledge 1958).
79 Benvenisti (n 9) (examining avoidance doctrines as a tool for enhancing executive discretion,
and advancing judicial dialogue among national courts on matters of treaty interpretation as mechanisms for reining it in).

